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The Sources and Scope of Federal Procedural Common
Law: Some Reflections on Erie and Gasperini
Wendy Collins Perdue·
I have been teaching Erie 1 for fifteen years and it does not seem to be
getting any easier. The Supreme Court has not helped. Burlington
Northern Railroad v. Woods, 2 West v. Conrai/, 3 Stewart Organization,
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 4 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,S and most recently
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. 6 seem to create more questions
than they answer. One curious phenomenon I have observed as I have
guided students through this material is that the less they have heard
about the Supremacy Clause and preemption, the easier Erie is to teach.
Student confusion in this area probably reflects the way Erie cases are
traditionally presented and understood. It is common to present Erie
questions as if they are standard choice of law problems, that is, as if we
had a valid federal rule on the one hand and a valid state rule on the
other and we were picking between them. 7 However, for students
recently exposed to the Supremacy Clause, picking between federal law
and state law would seem to be no choice at all-federal law is supposed
to win. 8
In Hanna v. Plumer9 and later Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp. ,1° the Supreme Court clarified that Erie did not eliminate the
Supremacy Clause in diversity cases-where there is a valid Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure or a valid federal statute on point, it applies. Despite
Hanna and Ricoh and John Hart Ely's careful explanation, 11 this has been

• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1975, Wellesley College; J.D.
1978, Duke University. I am grateful to Richard Freer and Tom Arthur for their very helpful
comments and suggestions. Copyright 0 1998 by Wendy Collins Perdue. Used by permission of
Wendy Collins Perdue.
I. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. 480 U.S. I (1987).
3. 481 u.s. 35 (1987).
4. 487 u.s. 22 (1988).
5. 501 u.s. 32 (1991).
6. 116 s. Ct. 2211 (1996).
7. See, e.g., Comment, Choice of Procedure in Diversity Cases, 15 YALE L.J. 477, 480-81
(1966).
8. See Peter Westen & JeffreyS. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death ofDiversity?,
78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 314 (1980).
9. 380 u.s. 460 (1965).
10. 487 u.s. 22 (1988).
II. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth o/Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693 (1974).
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a difficult point for some courts. For example, in Harvey's Wagon
Wheel, Inc. v. Van Blitter, 12 the Ninth Circuit, after finding that there was
a valid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure on point, went on to detennine
whether applying the rule would violate Erie. Even more startling is
Kampa v. White Consolidated Industries. 13 In Kampa, the plaintiff
brought suit in federal court under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. 14
The plaintiff would not have had a right to a jury in state court, but the
Eighth Circuit concluded she did have a right to a jury under the Seventh
Amendment." The court then explained that "[t]he only remaining issue
is whether the Seventh Amendment guarantee must be balanced against
the mandate of the Erie doctrine." 16 Ultimately, the court concluded Erie
did not repeal the Seventh Amendment, but it reached this conclusion
without citing the Supremacy Clause. 17
The Eighth Circuit's suggestion that Erie might somehow override a
provision of the Constitution is both shocking and an understandable byproduct of current doctrine. While the Supreme Court has reaffinned that
federal supremacy operates when there is a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure, a statute, and, presumably, a constitutional provision that is
applicable, the Court's decisions seem to suggest that federal supremacy
operates differently in the case of the "typical, relatively unguided Erie
choice." 18 In these cases, courts are to focus on "outcome" 19 or the "twin
aims of the Erie rule,"20 or to balance state and federal interests. 21
Federal supremacy no longer seems relevant; indeed, some cases suggest
an almost reverse supremacy for state substantive law. For example, in
Byrd, the Court states that federal courts "must respect the definition of
state-created rights and obligations,"22 implying that the presence of state
law disables federal law. 23
One way that students sometimes reconcile the apparent supremacy (or
at least co-equal status) of state law vis-a-vis federal court-made rules in
Erie cases is to conclude that there is no federal common law, or that if
it exists it is not preemptive, or that it does not preempt state substantive

12. 959 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1992).
13. liS F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 1997).
14. See id at 585.
IS. See id. at 586.
16. /d. at 587.
17. See id.
18. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
19. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
20. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
21. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958).
22. /d. at 535 (emphasis added).
23. See Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search
of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 364 (1977).
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law at least in diversity cases. All of these conclusions are incorrect.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino24 and Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp. 25 highlight that federal courts can make federal common law that
preempts state substantive law even in diversity cases.
Sabbatino and Boyle, along with Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States/ 6 United States v. Kimbell Foods, /nc./ 1 and Hinderlider v. La
Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. / 8 are all what might be called
"classic" federal common law cases. 29 The Court seems to consider Erie
and the Rules of Decision Act irrelevant to these cases. 30 As the Court
asserted in Clearfield Trust, ''the rule of Erie R Co. v. Tompkins does not
apply to this action. The rights and duties of the United States on
commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal rather than
local law."31
One explanation for ignoring Erie when dealing with classic federal
common law cases is that on its face the Rules of Decision Act applies
only where federal law is inapplicable-if there is pertinent federal
common law, then that common law rule applies and the requirement to
look to state law is irrelevant. 32 As one article explains, the Rules of
Decision Act "directs the federal courts to apply state law with regard to
any issue that is not governed by a pertinent and valid federal rule. It
reminds the federal courts that if a valid federal rule exists-whether
constitutional, statutory, or judge-made-the federal rule shall govern.'m
Admittedly, some have argued that the Rules of Decision Act should be
interpreted to limit the common law authority of federal courts, even in
"classic" cases. 34 Whatever the strengths of these arguments, the federal
courts continue to create and apply classic federal common law and for
the most part do so without reference to the standard Erie tests. 35

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

376
487
318
440
304

u.s. 398 (1964).
u.s. 500 (1988).
u.s. 363 (1943).
u.s. 715 (1979).
u.s. 92 (1938).

See RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 984 (2d ed. 1995).
See George D. Brown, Federal Common Law and the Role ofthe Federal Courts in Private
Law Adjudication-A (New) Erie Problem?, 12 PACE L. REv. 229, 238, 254 (1992).
31. Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 366 (citations omitted); see also PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND 1llE FEDERAL SYSTEM 858 n.2 (3d ed. 1988) (stating it is clear that Erie is
inapplicable to issues under federal law).
32. See DeiCostello v.lntemational Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. lSI, 159 n.l3 (1983); United.

States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-93 (1973).
33. Westen & Lehman, supra note 8, at 315.
34. See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN 1llE POLITICAL ORDER 29-46 (1991).
35. As Professor Brown has explained, the usual way to reconcile federal common law with the
Rules of Decision Act is "by finding that a federal statute is relevant enough to the problem at hand
to satisfy the Act's reference to 'Acts of Congress."' Brown, supra note 30, at 248.

754

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

If we accept that classic federal common law exists and that the test
applied in Erie cases does not apply to classic federal common law cases,
the Erie doctrine becomes even more mysterious. If Erie is irrelevant
whenever a valid federal judge-made rule governs, when is the doctrine
applicable? Consider, for example, Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 36 a case
in which the Court assumes Erie is relevant. There the Court applied a
federal judge-made rule on sanctions rather than state law. 37 But if Erie
was irrelevant in Clearfield Trust because the issue in question was one
that was governed by federal judge-made law, why was Erie not equally
irrelevant in Chambers? In Chambers there was a pertinent and valid38
federal judge-made rule. Therefore, the Court could have said, as it did
in Clearfield Trust, that the issue is governed by federal common law and
that Erie "does not apply."
One way to reconcile Erie with federal supremacy is to treat the Erie
doctrine not as a rule for picking between state and federal law, but
instead as a rule for determining whether there is a valid federal common
law rule applicable in the area. This may be Justice Scalia's point in Sun
Oil v. Wortman 39 when he observes: "It is never the case under Erie that
either federal or state law-if the two differ-can properly be applied to
a particular issue.'"'0 Thus, returning to Chambers, the Erie question in
that case was not "shall we apply the federal common law rule or apply
state law," but "shall we create a federal common law rule.'"''
Understood this way, Erie cases pose the same question that classic ·
federal common law cases pose. 42
One might object that classic federal common law and Erie cases are
not really the same, because the common law rules at issue in the two
types of cases are quite different. Classic federal common law cases
involve substantive law that is preemptive in state court. Erie cases, in
contrast, involve federal common law that is more procedural in nature

36. SOl U.S. 32 (1991).
37. See id.
38. For a discussion of the difference between pertinence and validity, see Westen & Lehman,
supra note 8, at 342.
39. 486 u.s. 717 (1988).
40. /d. at 727.
41. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 8, at 314 ("The real task under Erie ... is not to choose
between federal law and state law, but rather to decide if there really is a valid federal rule on the
issue.").
42. See Richard N. Bourne, Federal Common Law and the Erie-Byrd Rule, 12 U. BALT. L.
REv. 426,468 (1983); Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 1958 (1991).
Both Bourne and Stein argue that the proper approach in Erie cases is a version of the Byrd
balancing test (rather than Hanna). In contrast, this Essay goes one step further and examines how
so-called Erie cases would be analyzed if Byrd and Hanna were abandoned entirely and Erie cases
were approached like classic federal common law cases.
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and which does not apply outside of the federal courts. 43 It is true that
the federal common law rules the Court applies in cases such as
Chambers are procedural rules that would not preempt state law in a suit
in state court. Nonetheless, these rules are no less common law rules and
no less federal. There are federal statutes44 and indeed constitutional
provisions4s that are procedural and apply only in federal court, but these
are interpreted and applied like any other statute or constitutional
provision. Federal common law could be approached the same way with
one test, applied in all cases, regardless of whether the common law rule
is substantive or procedural.
The traditional approach to classic federal common law is a two step
inquiry. 46 First, the court determines whether the issue is properly subject
to the exercise of federal power (the power prong). Second, the court
considers whether as a matter of policy it is wise to adopt a federal rule
rather than relying on state law (the choice prong). In Clearfield Trust,
for example, the Court held that it had the power to create a federal
common law rule and that a uniform national rule was appropriate. 47 In
Kimbell Foods, the Court held that the area was properly governed by
federal law, but that a uniform national rule was not required, and the
Court therefore incorporated state law. 48
In this Essay I explore what traditional Erie cases would look like if
we treated those cases just like classic federal common law cases.49 I
conclude that such an approach is consistent with Erie itself and is also

43. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 30, at 230-31 (excluding "matters ofjurisdiction or procedure"
from the definition of federal common law).
44. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (1994).
45. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
46. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 337 (2d ed. 1994); Stephen B. Burbank,
Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General
Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 733, 759 (1986); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of
Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REv. 883, 886 (1986) (questioning whether the test really is two
steps); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise ofErie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.

REv. 383,410 (1964). Even if, as Professor Field argues, the two steps ultimately collapse into one,
I think that the two step approach is helpful in illuminating traditional Erie cases. See Field, supra,
at 950-53
47. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
48. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 740 (1979).
49. There has been extensive and interesting commentary on the scope of classic federal
common law. See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 34, at 29-43; Brown, supra note 30; Donald L.
Dornberg, Juridical Chameleons in the "New Erie" Canal, 1990 UTAH L. REv. 759; Field, supra
note 46; Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. I
(1985); Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 805 (1989). In this Essay, I
will not engage that literature. Instead, my object here is to show how the standard approach to
classic federal common law could be applied to Erie cases. A more extended analysis might examine
the impact on Erie cases of some of the variations in the understanding· of classic federal common
law. This Essay does not undertake that more extended analysis.
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consistent with many of the holdings, if not the language, of traditional
Erie cases. This unified approach to substantive and procedural federal
common law might have some advantages. In addition to providing
conceptual uniformity, this approach would offer an escape from current
Erie doctrine, which is confused and unsatisfactory. Under the current
doctrine, the Court appears to vacillate between the balancing test of Byrd
and the modified outcome test of Hanna. These two tests are largely
inconsistent, and the Court has offered no explanation for how they
interrelate. The Court's most recent Erie case, Gasperini, offers little
guidance on how to reconcile these two conflicting tests. Instead of
tinkering with Byrd and Hanna, maybe it is time to try something more
dramatic. This Essay is an exploration of one such alternative approach.
I.

APPLYING THE TWO PRONG TEST TO ERIE CASES

A.

Defining Federal Common Law

Before examining the test for classic federal common law, it is useful
to clarify what I mean by "federal common law." I am using that term
in a very broad sense. I include within federal common law any courtmade rule in which "the substance of that rule is not clearly suggested by
federal enactments."50 This definition includes much that might be called
"interpretation." However, as one article explains:
Thedifference between "common law" and "statutory interpretation" is a
difference in emphasis rather than a difference in kind. The more definite and
explicit the prevailing legislative policy, the more likely a court will describe
its lawmaking as statutory interpretation; the less precise and less explicit the
perceived legislative policy, the more likely a court will speak of common law.
The distinction, however, is entirely one of degree.~ 1

Under the Supreme Court's current approach to Erie, it makes a big
difference whether a rule is seen as a mere interpretation or is understood
instead as a common law rule. 52 If, for example, a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure is interpreted to be "on point," it applies. On the other hand,
where there is no Rule on point and instead the court creates a common
law rule, an entirely different analysis applies. The difficulty of this line

SO. Field, supra note 46, at 890; see also Merrill, supra note 49, at S.
Westen & Lehman, supra note 8, at 332.
52. For a discussion of the Court's unhelpful case law on this point, see Stein, supra note 42,
at 1959-61.
Sl.
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drawing is well illustrated by a recent set of lower court decisions
concerning the pleading of punitive damages. 53
Several states have enacted rules that prohibit plaintiffs from including
claims for punitive damages in their original complaint. 54 Instead, the
plaintiff must move for permission to include such a claim. For example,
Florida law provides, "In any civil action, no claim for punitive damages
shall be permitted unless there is a reasonable showing by evidence in the
record or proffered by the claimant which would provide a reasonable
basis for recovery of such damages."" Lower courts have split on the
question of whether a federal court is required to follow such a rule. 56
Much of the analysis focuses on the meaning of Rules 8 and 9. My own
view is that the satellite proceedings concerning punitive damages that
these .state rules require are indeed inconsistent with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, but I would be hard pressed to say whether my
conclusion constitutes an "interpretation" of the Rules or a common law
rule that is simply derived from the overall structure of Rules 8, 9, 11,
and 15. Rather than attempt to differentiate between interpretation and
common law, I, like many other commentators, use a very broad
definition of common-law.

B.

The Sources of Federal Power

In classic federal common law cases, the first step is to identify the
source of federal power. The question posed by the power prong reflects
one of the central points of Erie-the exercise of federal power must be
grounded in a federal enactment (i.e., the Constitution, statutes, or
treaties). The absence of relevant state law does not create federal power.
Thus, even if Swift v. Tyson 57 were correct that the Rules of Decision Act
refers only to state statutory law and state common law on "local"
matters, this absence of state law does not create federal power to fill in
the gaps. If we take seriously this central point of Erie, ,then every socalled Erie case should begin not with a discussion of the nature of the

53. Cases applying the state rule include: Teel v. United Techs. Pratt & Whitney, 953 F. Supp.
1534, 1537-39 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Sanders v. Mayor's Jewelers, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 571, 575 (S.D. Fla.
1996); Windsor v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 684 F. Supp. 630, 633 (D. Idaho 1988); Fournier
v. Marigold Foods, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1420, 1422 (D. Minn. 1988). Cases not applying the state rule
include: Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., No. 92-C4171, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13270 (N.D.lll.
Aug. 26, 1997); Tutor Time Child Care Sys., Inc. v. Franks Inv. Group, 966 F. Supp. ll88, ll93
(S.D. Fla. 1997); NAL II, Ltd. v. Tonkin, 705 F. Supp. 522, 527-28 (D. Kan. 1989).
54. See: e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 768.72 (West Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE§ 6-1604(2) (1990);
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 512-604.1 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 549.191 (West 1988); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(1) (Supp. 1997).
55. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72.
56. See supra note 53.
57. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

758

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

state law, but instead with a discussion of the source of federal authority.
Of course, where there is a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or a statute
involved, the courts do begin by looking at that basis for federal
authority. However, even if there is no enactment specifically on point
and we are therefore within the realm of federal common law, courts
should 'still begin by identifying the source of their common law
authority.
There are a number of possible sources of relevant common law
authority. One arguable source that Erie itself eliminates is the grant of
diversity jurisdiction. Although one could argue that the grant of
diversity jurisdiction confers common law authority on the federal courts,
just as the grant of admiralty jurisdiction has been so construed,ss Erie
appears to reject this proposition.s9 Even eliminating diversity jurisdiction
as a source of procedural federal common law, many others remain.
First, the court may make procedural common law in order to implement the substantive provisions of the Constitution, federal statutes, or of
other federal common law. For example, in New York Times v.
Sullivan, 60 the Court held that defamation cases must be proved with
"convincing clarity.'o6 1 This burden of proof rule derived from the First
Amendment. 62 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 63 the Court
created burden of proof rules for Title VII cases. More recently, in
Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 64 the Court hinted that it might create
federal common law niles of pleading as an augment to the federal
common law doctrine of immunity.6.s Of course, in all of these examples,
the common law rules, though procedural in some sense, are bound up
with federal substantive rights and hence are likely to be applicable in
both state and federal court.
Second, certain constitutional provisions and statutes may provide a
basis for common law rule-making that is applicable only in federal
court. For example, the federal courts have long recognized that they
have "inherent power" to create common law rules concerning contempt

58. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 95-96 (1981); Southern
Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917) (stating that Congress has the ultimate power to
determine maritime law); David Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess,"
1960 SUP. CT. REv. 158, 159 (discussing that federal law governs admiralty cases).
59. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973); Ely, supra
note II, at 713; Martha Field, The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law, 12 PACE L. REv. 303, 306
(1992).
60. 376 u.s. 254 (1964).
61. /d. at 285-86.
62. See id. at 285.
63. 411 u.s. 792, 802 (1973).
64. 507 u.s. 163 (1993).
65. See id. at 166-87.
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of court. 66 In addition, federal courts have created a federal common law
doctrine of forum non conveniens applicable in federal court. 67 Although
the Court has not been clear about its sources of authority for these
doctrines, both doctrines may be based on the Article III ''judicial
power'>68 or the statutes creating the federal courts. 69
Finally, as Hanna recognized, there is federal authority to promulgate
rules for the general operation of the federal courts. 70 This power extends
to all rules "which, though falling within the uncertain area between
substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as
either."71 Relying on its power to create a federal court system and the
Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act,
and the Court in tum has promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 72 The Rules, just like any statute, provide a basis for common
law law-making. As Professor Burbank has observed, "[i]n authorizing
the Court to promulgate Federal Rules, Congress must have contemplated
that the federal courts would interpret them, fill their interstices, and,
when necessary, ensure that their provisions were not frustrated by other
legal rules.'m
The federal courts' power to make common law based on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure carries a significant constraint. The Rules
Enabling Act authorizes rules of "practice and procedure"74 and prohibits
rules that "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. " 7 Where
courts are engaged in interstitial law-making and filling the gaps in the

66. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., SO I U.S. 32, 43-46 ( 1991 )(discussing various inherent
powers); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (noting the inherent power of a
court to dismiss a case sua sponte for lack of prosecution); United States v. Hudson, I I U.S. (7
Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (noting inherent power to fine for contempt).
67. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
SOl (1947).
68. U.S. CONST. art. III.
69. Absent statutory authority, Article III may grant limited inherent power over procedure to
the federal courts. See Michael Martin, Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress Did Not Write
into the Federal Rules of Evidence, 51 TEx. L. REv. 167, 186-93 (1979) (arguing that courts have
inherent authority, without statutory authorization, to make procedural rules that are "indispensable
to the court's functioning"); William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining
Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect
of the Sweeping Clause, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 102, 129 ("Anything broader

than a power deemed indispensable to enable a court to proceed with a given case appears to require
statutory support.").
70. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
71. /d.
72. See id.
73. Stephen B. Burbank, Jnterjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal
Common Law: A General Approach, 11 CORNELL L. REv. 733, 773 (1986).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994).
75. /d.
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the courts should be constrained by
these limits of the Rules Enabling Act. As the Court observed in Cooter
& Gel/ v. Hartmax Corp./6 "[w]e interpret [a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure] in light of the scope of the congressional authorization." 77
The Rules Enabling Act may constrain courts, even where they are not
directly interpreting a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure but are instead
creating a federal common law rule of "practice and procedure." As
Professors Westen and Lehman argue, "the statutory prohibition on rules
that abridge 'substantive rights' must be deemed to apply to judge-made
rules too; otherwise, judges could do through common law adjudication
what they cannot do through the carefully circumscribed and safeguarded
mechanisms used to create the federal rule of civil procedure."78 Thus,
the constraints of the Rules Enabling Act should apply regardless of
whether courts are interpreting a promulgated Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure or creating a common law rule of procedure.
Some may recoil at this argument that jumbles Rules Enabling Act
cases with Rules of Decision Act cases. After Hanna and Professor Ely
made such progress in breaking them apart, it may seem like heresy to
put them back together. As odd as this conjunction may seem, I think it
flows from the simple step of focusing as an initial matter on the source
of the federal common law authority. For example, consider Hanna.
The Court asserts that even if the service of process issue in question
were not governed by Rule 4/9 federal common law could properly be
applied. 80 But what would be the source of the Court's authority to make
such a common law rule? If its source of authority is the general power .
to create rules for the court's operation, then such a common law rule
should be constrained by the Rules Enabling Act.
With respect to promulgated Rules, the Court has in fact paid little
attention to the limitations of the Rules Enabling Act. It has reasoned
that in the promulgation process, the Rules were reviewed and approved
by the Advisory Committee, the Court, and Congress, and that the Rules
therefore carry a heavy presumption of validity. 81 However, once we
recognize that the Rules, like a statute, provide a basis for common law
elaboration, the limitations of the Rules Enabling Act become more
significant. While the literal text of the Rules may have been reviewed

76. 496 u.s. 384 (1990).
77. /d. at 391.
78. Westen & Lehman, supra note 8, at 365; cf Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353
n.ll (1959) ("The power of this Court to prescribe rules of procedure and evidence for the federal
courts exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of Congress.").
79. FED. R. CIV. P. 4.
80. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466 (1965).
81.. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. I, 6 (1987).
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in the promulgation process, the common law elaborations obviously have
not been reviewed. Where common law rule-making is involved, courts
should make a more careful inquiry, because the procedural safeguards
of the promulgation process will not have been used.
There are two important limitations on what I have said so far. First,
the fact that courts have the power to make a common law rule does not
end the inquiry, it will still be necessary to decide whether to exercise
that power (the choice prong). Second, the Rules Enabling Act does not
limit all federal common law, only that which is based on the power to
create general rules for court operations. Other federal statutes and
constitutional provisions are possible sources of federal common law
authority that would not be limited by the Rules Enabling Act.

C.

The Choice Prong

If a court determines that it has a basis to create federal common law,
that does not end the inquiry-,the court next must decide whether to
create a uniform federal rule or to apply state law. The choice prong is
well illustrated by DeSylva v. Ballentine. 82 In DeSylva, the Court applied
a state law definition of "children" in construing the meaning of that
word in the federal Copyright Act. 83 The Court noted that "(t]he scope
of a federal right is, of course, a federal question, but that does not mean
that its content is not to be determined by state, rather than federallaw." 84
Similarly, in Kimbell Foods, the Court applied state law in determining
whether a federal government lien takes priority over a private lien when
the government seeks to recover on a defaulted loan. 85 The Court
explained:
Undoubtedly, federal programs that "by their nature are and must be uniform
in character throughout the Nation" necessitate formulation of controlling
federal rules. Conversely, when there is little need for a nationally uniform
body of law, state law may be incorporated as the federal rule of decision.
Apart from considerations of uniformity, we must also determine whether
application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal
programs. If so, we must fashion special rules solicitous of those federal
interests. Finally, our choice-of-law inquiry must consider the extent to which
application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated
on state law.86

Professor Field well summarized the test for this stage: "federal rules
will be made when there is a need for national uniformity that outweighs

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

351 u.s. 570 (1956).
See id. at 580-82.
/d. at 580.
See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 740 (1979).
/d. at 728-29 (citations omitted).
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the need for uniformity within a state; or when national interests require.
But state law should apply whenever that result is not inconsistent with
federal purposes. " 87
Much of what has been described as the "Rules of Decision Act"
analysis, 88 can be understood to fall under this choice prong. Thus,
Hanna's "twin aims of Erie" analysis and the Byrd balancing test can be
seen as different approaches to the choice prong. Indeed, both Hanna
and Byrd seem to reflect portions of the test used in other areas of federal
common law and captured by Professor Field's synthesis quoted above.
Hanna seems to focus on the need for intrastate uniformity; Byrd includes
the idea that there may be a need for a national standard. But both
Hanna and Byrd are inadequate tests for the choice prong and, of the
two, Hanna is the least satisfactory.
Hanna explained that in deciding whether to apply a state or federal
rule, courts should focus on the "twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of
the laws."89 The test appears to focus on the litigants and to prohibit
federal courts from adopting common law rules that have a significant
impact on litigants. Others have criticized this dicta in Hanna, 90 and I
add my voice to that chorus.
The supposed focus on affecting choice of forum has always been
unclear. In Hanna itself, the Court asserts that different service rules
would not affect choice of forum, but this is not so obvious. Under the
Massachusetts service rule, it was necessary to serve the executor in
person. 91 Under the federal rule, it was sufficient to leave process at the
executor's place of abode. 92 If there is little time left before the
expiration of the statute of limitations, this difference could be significant
to litigants.
Maybe the court is not supposed to focus on the specifics of the actual
case, but to imagine an "average" case. But even this qualification does
not help much. For example, a number of states now require that in
particular types of actions, such as medical malpractice, attorneys must
file affidavits stating that they have consulted an expert and the expert

87. Field, supra note 46, at 962.
88. Redish & Phillips, supra note 23, at 373.
89. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
90. See, e.g., Redish & Phillips, supra note 23, at373-77; Stein, supra note 42, at 1946-53.
91. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at461.
92. See id. at 461-62.
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has found the case meritorious. 93 Federal district courts have split on
whether these requirements should apply in federal courts. 94
The Tenth Circuit recently held such a state law requirement to be
applicable in federal court because of forum shopping concems. 9' The
court explained: "A plaintiff alleging professional negligence is likely to
seek a forum without the certificate of review hurdle either to avoid extra
cost, to give himself or herself more time to build a meritorious case, or
to increase the settlement value of his or her claims once litigation
begins."96 The court's analysis seems to assume that in most cases or in
the average case, plaintiffs' lawyers do not consult experts early in the
case and if they do when forced to do so, the expert is likely to find the
case to be without merit. The court's analysis includes significant
assumptions about what is normal practice and · what changes are
important enough to affect a litigant's choice of forum. These are
empirical questions, yet, the courts show no particular interest in
consulting empirical data. They rely instead on hunch and instinct
concerning the factors that affect a lawyer's choice of forum. It is not
surprising that courts have different hunches and, thus, reach different
conclusions.
What factors affect a litigant's choice of forum? Professor Casad
authored an entire book on the subject. 97 In addition, there are a number
of empirical studies on what affects choice of forum as between state and
federal courts. 98 In these studies, the pace of litigation was a major factor

93. See generally Jefferey A. Parness & Amy Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading: Any Merit
to Special Certificates of Merit?, 1991 BYU L. REv. 537, 538-75 (1997) (analyzing various states'
approaches to certification of medical malpractice actions). ·
94. Compare Oslund v. United States, 701 F. Supp. 710, 714 (D. Minn. 1988) (applying state
law), with Doe v. City of Chicago, 883 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (not applying state law),
and Boone v. Knight, 131 F.R.D. 609, 611·12 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (not applying state law).
95. See Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1540-41 (lOth Cir.
1996).
96. /d. at I 541.
97. See ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION AND FORUM SELECTION (1988).
98. See Kristin Bumiller, Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases: Analysis of a Survey and
Implications for Reform, I 5 L. & SOC'Y REV. 749, 749-74 (1980); James D. Cameron, Federal
Review, Finality ofState Court Decisions, and a Proposal for a National Court of Appeals-A State
Judge's Solution to a Continuing Problem, 1981 BYU L. REv. 545, 550-53; Jerry Goldman &
Kenneth S. Marks, Diversity Jurisdiction and Local Bias: A Preliminary Empirical Inquiry, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 93, 94-104 (1980); Thomas B. Marvell, The Rationales for Federal Question
Jurisdiction: An Empirical Examination ofStudent Rights Litigation, 5 WIS. L. REv. 1315, 1352-71
(1984); Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 369,392-423 (1992); Jolanta Perlstein, Lawyers'
Strategies and Diversity Jurisdiction, 3 L. & PoL'Y Q. 321, 327-36 (1981); Marvin R. Summers,
Analysis ofFactors That Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 41 IOWA L. REv. 933, 93340 ( 1962); Note, The Choice Between State and Federal Court in Diversity Cases in Virginia, 51 VA.
L. REV. 178, 180-95 (1965).
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affecting choice of forum. 99 One study found that in the "rocket docket"
of the federal district of Eastern Virginia, a whopping 71% of the
attorneys indicated that the faster court process in federal court affected
their choice of forum. 100 If we take seriously Hanna's concern about
affecting choice of forum, then any court-made innovations intended to
speed up the litigation process are suspect under Erie. 101
Also suspect would be the Supreme Court's efforts to make summary
judgment more readily available in federal court. In a study of removable cases, nearly half of the defense attorneys reported that the
availability of summary judgment was an important factor in their forum
choice. 102 Of course the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure address
summary judgment, but the Rules do not explicitly set forth the standard
for granting summary judgment. Rule 56 provides that summary
judgment shall be granted if there is "no genuine issue of material fact,"
but the Rule does not define "genuine." Some states consider the
presence of a "scintilla of evidence" sufficient to create a genuine issue. 103
If we take seriously the concern about affecting choice of forum, then

99. See Bumiller, supra note 98, at 762-67; Marvell, supra note 98, at 1359; Miller, supra note
98, at 404-07; Perlstein, supra note 98, at 329.
100. Miller, supra note 98, at 406.
I 0 I. It may be the case that such docket control techniques are authorized by the Civil Justice
Reform Act (CJRA) and therefore are valid regardless of the effect on litigant equality or forum
shopping. But cf Ashland Chern. Inc. v. Barco Inc., 123 F.3d 261,268 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that
a local rule concerning fee shifting is not within the scope of the CJRA). What is noteworthy about
the CJRA is that it does not identify the effect on forum shopping as a relevant consideration.
Professor Ely argues "forum shopping is not an evil per se," but the presence of forum shopping
constitutes good evidence that the difference between the state and federal rules is sufficient to
produce unfairness between litigants who do and do not have access to federal court. Ely, supra note
II, at 710. He summarizes the twin aims of Erie test as follows:
[A] federal court may adhere to its own rules in diversity cases insofar, but only insofar,
as they are neither materially more or less difficult for the burdened party to comply with
than their state counterparts, nor likely to generate an outcome different from that which
would result were the case litigated in the state court system and the state court rules
followed.
/d. at 714. Applying this test, he argued that the service rules at issue in Hanna were not
significantly different in burden. See id. at 717-18. He noted, however, that if "one of the time
limits was so much shorter than the other that it rendered compliance on the part of a diligent litigant
or attorney substantially more burdensome, the Court presumably would require that the state rule
be followed." /d. at 714 n.123. This analysis would seem to apply equally well to docket control
methods that substantially increased or decreased the time to trial. Yet, I think it unlikely the Court
would ever find that such rules violate Erie.
102. See Miller, supra note 98, at 418.
103. See, e.g., Brown v. Turner, 497 So. 2d 1119, 1120 (Ala. 1986).
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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 104 and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 10' may be
suspect under Erie. 106
The supposed concerns about litigant equality and affecting choice of
forum also present another problem: it is difficult to explain why the
Supreme Court and Congress are largely indifferent to this effect in the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 107 The discovery
rules were a major innovation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and studies indicate that substantial differences in the availability of
discovery affect choice of forum. 108 Why is it that a factor we think is
dispositive with respect to a federal common law rule is irrelevant in the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? One might reply
that the legislature is in the best position to determine whether an effect
on choice of forum is justified by other considerations. Congress reviews
promulgated Rules, but has no opportunity to review common law rules.
Therefore, courts, which are not as competent to make the value
judgment, should be vigilant in preventing any such effect in common
law rules. Yet I see little evidence that Congress or the Supreme Court,
in promulgating the Rules, has paid much attention to the effect on choice
of forum, 109 and therefore this theory does not ring true.
The Hanna Court purports to derive its focus on litigant equality from
Erie. 110 Although Erie does assert that Swift v. Tyson "rendered
impossible equal -protection of the law," 111 the inequality the Court

104. 477 u.s. 242 (1986).
105. 477 u.s. 317 (1986).
106. Summary judgment rules may also affect ultimate outcome although it would be very
difficult to detennine how often this will be the case. Many plaintiffs who survive under the scintilla
of evidence test may lose at trial-many, but surely not all. Moreover, a high percentage of these
cases probably settle, but they may settle for amounts larger than zero, which is what the plaintiffs
would receive if they lost on summary judgment
107. As one article observes, "the forum shopping that is allowed under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is certainly awkward." Redish & Phillips, supra note 23, at 377 n.l21.
108. See Summers, supra note 98, at 937-38; Note, supra note 98, at 188-90; see also CASAD,
supra note 97, § 2.09.
I09. One occasion in which Congress did consider the effect of a Rule on choice of forum was
in connection with a proposed federal evidence rule of privilege. See 2 DAVID LoUIS ELL &
CHRISTOPHER MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 200 (2d ed. 1985). The Rules Advisory Committee
had proposed a unifonn set of evidence rules that would have altered many evidentiary privileges as
recognized by state law. See id. Congress ultimately rejected this proposal and drafted its own rule
that recognized state privileges "where an element of a claim or defense [is one] as to which State
law supplies the rule of decision." FED. R. EVID. 50 I. While a concern for forum shopping was one
of the expressed reasons for congressional intervention, the Committee's proposed privilege rule was
highly controversial on the merits because it would have eliminated certain well-recognized
privileges. See 2 LoUISELL & MUELLER, supra, § 200. In any event, the attention to forum
shopping in connection with Rule 50 I stands as the exception rather than the rule.
110. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965).
Ill. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75 (1938).
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focuses on is not different treatment of litigants but the fact that under
Swift v. Tyson certain people were permitted to behave differently in the
world. 112 This is evident from the examples of inequality that the Court
gives: a party that was diverse was permitted to enter into an exclusive
contrad 13 or to contract out of liability when a non-diverse party could
not do the same. 114 These examples suggest that it was the differing rules
concerning what Justice Harlan later called "primary activity of citizens"
that "give rise to a debilitating uncertainty in the planning of everyday
affairs." 115
The Supreme Court's decision in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. 116 provides
a useful example. In Chambers, the district court, relying on its inherent
power to sanction bad faith litigation conduct, ordered the defendant to
pay all of the plaintiff's attorney fees, totaling nearly one million
dollars. 117 Although state law would not have permitted such an award,
the Supreme Court upheld the sanction. 118 The Court explained that the
application of a different rule in federal court would not promote forum
shopping, because imposition of the sanction "depends not on which party
wins the lawsuit, but on how the parties conduct themselves during. the
litigation." 119 This supposed eJ!:planation simply ignores the possibility of
forum shopping. The plaintiff who fears such conduct from the
defendant may prefer federal court, the defendant who intends to engage
in such conduct may prefer state court.
The Supreme Court does no better with the second of the twin aims.
The Court writes: ''Nor is it inequitable to apply the exception to citizens
and noncitizens alike, when the party, by controlling his or her conduct
in litigation, has the power to determine whether sanctions will be assessed."120 Here, the Court seems to say that there is no inequitable
administration of the laws because the federal rule is fair. I believe this
misconstrues Hanna. The "twin aims of Erie" test does not invite federal
112. See id. at 73-76.
113. See id. at 73.
114. See id. at 75.
II S. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474. Ely argues that the concern about uncertainty is overdrawn. See
Ely, supra note II, at 711; see also Stein, supra note 42, at 195 I. He notes that in most cases the
conflicting rules are not mutually exclusive and, therefore, one can comply with both rules by
complying with the more demanding of the rules. See id. I believe that Ely underestimates the
impact of conflicting rules. See Redish & Phillips, supra note 23, at 382. Imagine, for example, a
highway with two different posted speed limits. Although people could simply comply with the
lower limit (and thereby comply with both), I would expect a lot of confusion and additional
accidents.
116. SOl U.S. 32 (1991).
117. See id. at 40-41.
118. See id. at SS-58.
119. Id. at 53.
120. /d.
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courts to make an independent assessment of the fairness of a rule.
Instead, it focuses on the differences between what the state and federal
courts would do. The Chambers Court just ignores the fact that the same
conduct in state court would not have cost a million dollars.
I believe Chambers is rightly decided but not for the reasons the Court
gives. Analyzed under the choice prong, this is a case in which it is
appropriate to apply a federal rule. A different federal sanction for
litigation behavior may well alter the attractiveness of federal courts and
can produce differences of great significance to the parties. However,
different sanctions are unlikely to alter primary behavior or cause the
kind of "confusion" about which Erie and the choice prong express
concern. Thus, there is no particular need for intrastate uniformity. On
the other hand, in order to function effectively, fedenil courts need to be
able to control litigant misconduct.
Byrd121 comes closer to embodying the traditional choice prong for
federal common law, but it too has problems. First, although Byrd is
ambiguous, one plausible reading is that federal courts are prohibited
from displacing a state substantive interest. 122 I believe this interpretation
is inconsistent with principles of federal supremacy. There may be some
small enclave of state supremacy, 123 but that enclave does not include
areas such as general tort or contract law. After Boyle and Sabbatino,
there is no question that classic federal common law can displace state
substantive law in these areas. It is necessary, of course, to determine
whether there is a basis for federal common law, but having found such
a basis, the scope of federal law should not be dependent on the existence
of state law. The presence of a state substantive purpose is important,
but not because it disables federal law. Instead, it is important because
where a state rule is bound up with a state substantive right, there is
likely to be a high need for intrastate uniformity.
To summarize, in deciding whether to apply a state rule or a federal
procedural common law rule, a court should do what it would do in any
federal common law case. First, it should identify the source of its
common law law-making authority, along with any limitations that might
accompany that source. Second, assuming there is a basis for a federal
common law rule, the court should proceed to the choice prong and
consider whether the national interest requires a federal rule or the need
for national uniformity outweighs the need for uniformity within a state.

121. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
122. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 218 (2d ed. 1990).
123. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992). But see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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The Supreme Court's most recent Erie case is Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc. 124 Analyzed under more standard Erie doctrine,
Gasperini seems confusing and unsatisfactory. On the other hand, I
believe the proposed two prong approach can illuminate the case in ways
that traditional Erie doctrine does not.
In Gasperini, the plaintiff brought a diversity suit based on tort and
contract law, alleging that the defendant had lost photographic transparencies owned by the plaintiff. 125 The jury awarded $450,000 in compensatory damages, and the district court denied a motion for a new trial. 126
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the proper standard for reviewing
the size of the verdict is the standard provided by New York
law-whether the verdict "deviates materially from what would be
reasonable compensation." 127 The New York standard requires closer
judicial review of verdicts than the standard traditionally applied in
federal court of whether the verdict is "so exorbitant that it shocked the
conscience of the court." 128 The Second Circuit ordered a new trial
unless the plaintiff agreed to an award of $100,000. 129
The Supreme Court held that the federal trial court should have used
the New York standard in reviewing the verdict. 130 It also held that
federal courts of appeal should not independently review verdicts for
reasonableness, as New York law requires, but should review under an
abuse of discretion standard. 131 Thus, the district court standard of review
is governed by state law, while the appellate standard of review is
governed by federal law.
The Gasperini Court begins its analysis with the assertion that "[u]nder
the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive
law and federal procedural law." 132 The Court noted that distinguishing
between substance and procedure "is sometimes a challenging endeavor,"133 and went on to describe the Guaranty Trust "outcome-determina-

124. 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996).
125. See id. at 2216.
126. See id.
127. /d. at 2217 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § SS01(c) (McKinney 1995)).
128. /d.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 2219.
131. See id. at 2223.
132. /d. at 2219.
133. /d.
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tion test" and the Hanna "twin aims of Erie" test. 134 The Court
summarized the appropriate test by quoting from Hanna: "Would
'application of the [standard] ... have so important an effect upon the
fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to [apply] it would
[unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum State, or] be likely to
cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court'?" 135 Thus, the Court seems
to suggest that the focus should be entirely on actual and would-be
litigants, and that the appropriate test is whether the difference in rules
is significant enough that it will influence the choice of those who have
the option of federal court and will leave those who do not have such an
option wishing that they did.
Despite the articulation of a litigant-focused test, the Court offers no
analysis of how the difference in rules concerning standards for new trials
would affect litigants. The Court's failure is probably not surprising,
because such an analysis would be very problematic. The difference in
standards is likely to affect only those cases in which the verdict is (or
the lawyers predict it will be) greater than the "materially deviates"
standard, but less than "shocks the conscience." The Court offers no
analysis of how large this group of cases might be and indeed never even
asserts that this is a difference that would affect choice of forum.
Instead, the Court focuses its attention not on the litigants but on New
York law and concludes that the statute is substantive: "In sum, §
5501(c) contains a procedural instruction, but the State's objective is
manifestly substantive. It thus appears that if federal courts ignore [the
New York standard] . . . "'substantial" variations between state and
federal [money judgments]' may be expected." 136 The use of "thus" in
the above quote is quite striking. The Court simply asserts that because
the state law is "substantive," it automatically follows that failure to apply
that law will produce substantial variations.
The Court supports its conclusion of substantial variation by pointing
to the fact that the Second Circuit significantly lowered the award. 137
There are two problems with this conclusion. First, the Court made no
effort to distinguish Chambers in which a million dollars in attorney fees
was not sufficient to trigger the application of state law. In Gasperini,
in contrast, the difference between the jury's award and the Second
Circuit's remittitur was a substantially smaller sum of $350,000. Second,
given the Court's conclusion about the standard of review for courts of
appeal, it is odd to put much weight on the findings of the Second
Circuit. The Second Circuit ordered the award remitted to $100,000, but

134.
135.
136.
137.

See id. at 2220.
/d.
Jd. at 2220-21 (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted).

See id. at 2221 n.ll.
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that was vacated by the Supreme Court. 138 In fact, on remand, the
District Court applied the New York standard and ordered a remittitur of
only $75,000, lowering the verdict from $450,000 to $375,000. 139 The
court explained that its analysis was based on the entire record, including
review of exhibits that were not before the court of appeals because they
were not in the record sent to that court. 140 With prejudgment interest of
9%, the total award was $575,450.04, about $10,000 more than the
original judgment plus interest of $564,750. 141
The Supreme Court's analysis of the standard of appellate review
presents different problems. In this portion of the opinion, the Court
focused on Byrd and the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment.142 Interestingly, in this portion of the opinion, the Court made no
reference to its prior conclusion that the state law was substantive. This
omission is significant because Byrd implies that federal courts must
apply state substantive rules and should consider countervailing federal
interests only in the absence of a state substantive right. 143 The Court
made no mention of this interpretation of Byrd and simply describes
Byrd as holding that "the Guaranty Trust 'outcome-determination' test
was an insufficient guide in cases presenting countervailing federal
interests." 144 The Court then examined the countervailing federal interest
presented by the Reexamination Clause. 145
As in Byrd itself, the Court is unclear as to whether the Seventh
Amendment requires the result. Some have read Gasperini as holding
that the Seventh Amendment prohibits de novo review. 146 However, if
this were true, extended discussion of Byrd would be unnecessary.
Indeed, any discussion of Byrd would be unnecessary. All the Court
would have to do would be to state what the Seventh Amendment
required and then cite the Supremacy Clause. With what seems to be
deliberate ambiguity, the Court states that "practical reasons combine with
Seventh Amendment constraints to lodge in the district court, not the

138. See id. at 2225.
139. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 765, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
140. See id. at 769.
141. See Letter from Samuel A. Abady to Wendy Collins Perdue (Oct. 17, 1997) (on file with
the author). Given that the Second Circuit will be reviewing this award under an abuse of discretion
standard, the remittitur may well stand.
142. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2221.
143. See id. at 2221-22.
144. /d.
145. See id. at 2222-23.
146. See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 4511 (2d
ed. Supp. 1997).
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court of appeals, primary responsibility for application of § 5501(c)'s
'deviates materially' check." 147
Looking at the opinion as a whole, one interpretation might be that the
Court has essentially adopted the approach set forth by Professor
Chemerinsky. He has offered the following approach to Erie cases:
[I]f there is a conflict between federal and state law, in deciding whether to
apply state or federal Jaw, a three-step inquiry is used. First, is there a valid
federal statute or Rule of Civil or Appellate Procedure on point? If so, the
federal Jaw is to be applied by the federal court deciding a diversity action. If
there is not a valid, on point federal Jaw, the second inquiry is whether the
application of the state law is likely to detennine the outcome of the litigation.
If state law is not outcome detenninative, then federal law is applied. But once
it is concluded that state Jaw is likely to detennine the results, then the third
question is whether there is an overriding federal interest. If so, then federal
Jaw controls; otherwise, the state law that is outcome detenninative is applied. 148

If the Court meant to adopt this approach, it could have said so more
clearly. For example, with respect to the district court's standard for
reviewing verdicts, the Court gave no consideration to whether there were
countervailing federal interests. One could argue that a lower standard
for new trials may increase the number of trials in federal court and
impose significant burdens. This may not be a sufficiently large or likely
federal interest, but it would have been helpful for the Court to so state.
Similarly, as to the standard for appellate review, the Court gave no
consideration to whether this significantly affects outcome or choice of
forum. The Court may have thought that its discussion of the effect of
the trial standard extended to the standard for appellate review, though
one could argue that differences in standards of review would not result
in significant outcome differences or likely affect choice of forum. 149
I will not belabor the shortcomings of Gasperini, others have analyzed
these in greater detail. 150 Instead, I will tum to how Gasperini would
have been analyzed under the two prong analysis of federal common law.
B.

Gasperini Under the Two-Pronged Approach

Under the proposed approach, the first question is: What is the basis
for a federal rule? As to the standard for granting a new trial, an obvious
source of authority is Rule 59. 151 Justice Scalia argues in his dissent that

147.
148.
149.

Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2225.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 46, at 308.
See infra text following note 164.
ISO. See Richard Freer, Some Thoughts on the State ofErie After Gasperini, 78 TEx. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1998).
lSI. FED. R. CIV. P. 59.
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Rule 59 controls, m but the Rule does not in fact· explicitly
state a standard for granting new trials. Nonetheless, the Rule does refer
to the "reasons" for granting new trials, m and this provides a plausible
basis for interstitial common law rule-making.
If Rule 59 is the source of federal authority for the "shocks the
conscience" federal common law rule, the Court must next consider the
limitations imposed by the Rules Enabling Act. Interestingly, although
the Court in Gasperini purported to do a "twin aims of Erie" analysis, its
actual focus was on whether the New York rule involves substantive
rights. Thus, the Court's actual analysis can easily be understood as an
inquiry into whether a federal standard for granting new trials would
"abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 154 If a federal
common law rule that is based on Rule 59 violates the Rules Enabling
Act, then that common law rule fails the power prong and the inquiry
ends.
As the foregoing discussion highlights, the proposed two-pronged
approach begins by focusing on the scope of federal authority rather than
beginning with an examination of state law. The significance of this
approach is illustrated by a recent post-Gasperini district court case. In
Torres v. Wendco of Puerto Rico, Inc.,l 55 the district court found that
there was "no state statute" and no "substantive state laws governing
limitations in jury awards," and it therefore applied the federal "shocks
the conscience" standard of review in deciding whether to grant a
remittitur. 156 But what is the source of federal authority to create the
"shocks the conscience" standard? As I argued at the outset, a fundamental holding of Erie is that federal courts must have a basis for all
exercises of federal authority. The absence of a state statute does not
create federal authority. The square holding of Gasperini is that Rule 59
does not provide a standard for the grant of new trials. Moreover, if the
interstitial creation of a common law rule violates the Rules Enabling
Act, then Torres is clearly wrong.
The proposed analysis also illuminates an issue not addressed by
Gasperini-the standard for new trials in federal question cases. Rule
59's silence on the proper standard for the grant of a new trial extends to
152. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
I 53. Rule 59(a) provides:
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues (I)
in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new
trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States .

FED. R.
154.
ISS.
IS6.

CIV. P. S9(a).
28 u.s.c. § 2072(b) (1994).
No. 9S-1844 (CCC) (JA), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3182 (D.P.R. Jan. IS, 1997).
/d. at •11-•12.
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federal question cases. If the federal courts are to use a federal standard
in these cases, that standard would have to be a common law rule, and
the critical first question is the source of authority for such a rule. In
federal question cases, the court could derive a standard from the federal
statute that provides the underlying cause of action. Under this approach,
there may not be a uniform standard for all federal question cases because
the analysis would have to be done statute by statute. 157 In addition, with
respect to some or all federal statutes, the court·could borrow the relevant
state standard as is common with statutes of limitation. 158
Turning to the standard of appellate review, the federal courts have
another possible source of common law authority-the Seventh Amendment. 159 Of course, if the Seventh Amendment requires a particular
standard of appellate review, then that standard must be applied. Erie
does not alter the supremacy of the Constitution. However, in Byrd and
again in Gasperini, the Court refers to "the influence--if not the
command-of the Seventh Amendment." 160 This suggests that the
Seventh Amendment may provide a basis for common law rule-making
in which the court-created rule is not itself of constitutional dimensions. 161
This is similar to the common law rule in Sabbatino, which, although
based on the Constitution, could be altered by Congress. 162 The Court
has suggested that the same may be true of its rules concerning immunity!6J
Assuming that the Seventh Amendment provides the source of federal
power to create a federal common law rule concerning the standard of
review, the next step is the choice prong. This step requires an analysis
of the need for a national standard versus the need for intrastate
uniformity. The Court seems to interpret the Seventh Amendment as
embodying a strong preference for jury trials and for trial, rather than

157. Cf. Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and
Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 693, 705-08 (1988) (discussing federal question cases and
Rule 3).
158. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985).
159. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.
/d.

160. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., I 16 S. Ct. 221 I, 2222 (1996) (quoting Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958)).
161. Cf Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. I
(1975).
162. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1994).
. 163. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,748 n.27 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
500, 504 ( 1978).
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appellate, detenninations of fact. Against this strong national policy, the
Court must next consider the need for intrastate unifonnity. Although the
Court does not frame its analysis in those tenns, the Court does conclude
that ''New York's dominant interest can be respected, without disrupting
the federal system, once it is recognized that the federal district court is
capable of perfonning the checking function." 164
The Court seems to be suggesting that application of a different
standard of review in federal court would not create confusion or other
intrastate complications. This is a plausible conclusion. Even if the New
York law requiring de novo review was intended to lower awards, the
standard of appellate review may have very little impact on the aggregate
size of awards. Under de novo review, the court of appeals is more
likely to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.. This means
that defendants have two opportunities to seek remittitur. It also means
that if the trial judge orders remittitur, the plaintiff has a chance to undo
that ruling. It is, therefore, difficult to predict the impact of the different
standards of review without some theory about the relative deference to
juries of trial courts and courts of appeal. Given a strong national policy
and a weak showing of the need for intrastate unifonnity concerning the
standard of review, the choice of a federal common law rule seems
justified.
The foregoing analysis suggests that Gasperini may have been correctly
decided, but offers a different rationale to explain the holding. This
conclusion highlights that applying the two-pronged approach of classic
federal common law to Erie cases will not necessarily change the
holdings of Erie cases. It does, however, offer a relatively straightforward approach that extricates the courts from the unanswered dilemma of
when to use the approach of Byrd and when to use Hanna.
III. CONCLUSION

In posing hypothetical Erie cases, it is easy to frame the question to
students as "should the court apply the federal rule or the state rule?"
Such a fonnulation is misleading. It obscures the fact that valid federal
law, even federal common law, is always supreme. The proper question
is not "which rule should the court apply," but "is there an applicable
(and valid) federal rule?" Understood this way, Erie cases are simply a
small subset of preemption and federal common law cases, and they can
be analyzed as such.
In this Essay, I have explored what Erie doctrine would look like if we
treated Erie cases like classic federal common law cases and applied the
traditional two-pronged test used for federal common law. I do not

164.

Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2224.
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contend that under such an approach cases would always be easy.
However, this approach would provide some doctrinal clarity and
consistency. It might also be another step towards truly repressing the
"myth of Erie."

